

22 MAR 1950

RECEIVING MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**SUBJECT: 11 March Reply by Chairman McKee to 4 March
Letter from Mr. Douglas Dillon, Discussing
Preliminary Report on Inspection Aspects of
Fissionable Materials Cut-off Treaty**

1. The exchanges of letters between Chairman McKee and Mr. Douglas Dillon on 4 and 11 March discuss elements of a fissionable material production cut-off treaty which are required (they feel) to insure effective international control of these activities. In preparation for possible negotiations of these elements at Geneva, subject areas requiring further study within the US are delineated. In general, the systems envisioned will be concerned initially with existing and future production facilities and quantities of fissionable materials. Weapons materials from past production would be dealt with in later phases, perhaps by means of incremental "banking" of these materials by both sides with some international custodial organization.

2. Specifically, Chairman McKee feels that an effective fissionable materials production control system must provide for:

- (a) prior declaration of all nuclear facilities;
- (b) inspection and control of all declared plants;

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- (c) right of aerial over-flight;
- (d) right to carry out environmental sampling;
- (e) right of access to inspect areas indicated by the technical system and intelligence information to be suspicious;
- (f) life of treaty dependent upon inclusion of all nations capable of producing significant quantities of fissionable materials.

3. Accordingly, Chairman McKee proposed the following areas for further study, offering the services of the AEC in connection with item b.

- (a) Define the principal elements of the monitoring system and inspection rights required for effective control including arrangements enabling the use of intelligence data.

With respect to b, a (above), we feel the effective use of intelligence information by the control organization will require the establishing of a permanent mechanism, at least within the US delegation, by means of which the results of US

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Intelligence efforts will be available as a basis for such action as the IAEA feels is justified and prudent in the event of suspected treaty violations. It may not be necessary, as a general rule, to directly organize US intelligence information or sources in order to stimulate a particular investigation by the control organization, such as an on-site inspection of a suspicious industrial activity. Further, in determining the requirements of an "effective" system, it will be necessary that some "threshold or significant" quantity of fissionable materials be defined as the maximum permissible quantity which the other side might exceed without critically endangering US security. This threshold is needed for US planning alone and should not be incorporated in a treaty.

b. Examination of possible criteria on the basis of information from over-flights and environmental sampling, which the control agency may establish an area to be suspicious and hence subject

SUBJECT: 11 March Reply by Chairman McSane to 4 March Letter from Mr. Douglas Dillon, Discussing Preliminary Report on Inspection Aspects of Proliferable Materials Cut-off Treaty

to inspection.

It will be necessary in addition, we feel, to define criteria applying to non-control agency information, including that from national intelligence systems, in accordance with which an area will be considered suspicious by the control agency and hence subject to inspection.

c. Determination of classified information concerning capabilities of environmental sampling, aerial surveillance, and other intelligence techniques which the US would be prepared to reveal.

This area obviously raises problems since the capabilities of certain classified collection techniques; e.g., sampling, aerial photography, etc., must be revealed if they are to be included in the treaty as responsibilities of the control agency. Declassification notices would be required although this could be undertaken in a phased fashion, as it becomes clear that the other side is seriously seeking

SUBJECT: 11 March Reply by Chairman McNamara to 4 March Letter from Mr. Douglas Dillon, Discussing Preliminary Report on Inspection Aspects of Plausible Materials Cut-off Treaty

a mutually satisfactory treaty. Collection techniques other than those provided for in the treaty would not, of course, be subject to such revelation.

4. In general, the lines along which problems are being defined and areas designated for further study accord with our thinking. We tend to feel, however, that the technical and logistic requirements for an effective control system are less extensive than the ABC.

5. I disagree with Secretary Dillon's remark in the first paragraph on page 2 of his letter when he states that studies on techniques for discovering clandestine plants have only taken place recently. Intelligence has been doing this for years with considerable success under conditions much more difficult than those involved in a production run.

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HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR: AD/NE

This brief was requested by DCI to clarify the exchange of letters between Messrs. Dillon and McGee on what should be done to police a flammable materials production cut-off (letters attached to DCI's copy).



[Handwritten signature]

23 March 1960
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
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